2026年第83期(总第1227期)
演讲主题:Regulating Cyberwashing: False Claims, Hacker Threats, and Price Signaling
主讲人:芦涛 康涅狄格大学商学院副教授
主持人:关旭 供应链管理与系统工程系主任、教授
活动时间:2026年11月18日(周三)10:00-12:00
活动地址:管院大楼107教室
主讲人简介:
芦涛是康涅狄格大学(University of Connecticut)商学院运营与信息管理系副教授。他在香港科技大学工业工程与物流管理系获得博士学位,此前曾在荷兰鹿特丹管理学院(Erasmus University Rotterdam)担任助理教授。他的研究兴趣涵盖供应链管理、社会责任与可持续运营、平台经济以及运输物流等领域。他的研究成果发表于Management Science、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Operations Research、Information Systems Research、Production and Operations Management等国际顶级期刊,目前担任Management Science与Service Science的副主编。
活动简介:
Firms increasingly make cybersecurity claims that consumers cannot verify, creating opportunities for deceptive “cyberwashing.” We develop a signaling model in which a firm privately observes its cybersecurity level and chooses both a cybersecurity claim and a price; consumers infer cybersecurity from these signals, hackers decide whether to attack based on the expected payoff from compromising the firm’s consumer base, and regulators impose penalties on false claims. The model highlights a feedback mechanism absent from standard false-claim settings: cyberwashing expands demand but also increases exposure to cyberattacks, so demand expansion through lower pricing can serve as a credible signal of security. Cyberwashing arises when the false-claim penalty is low and the hacker payoff-to-cost ratio is moderate. Consumer surplus is maximized at a penalty just above the threshold that deters cyberwashing, while social welfare is maximized either at this threshold or at a higher penalty, depending on the severity of cyber threats. Broader cybersecurity governance can have non-monotonic welfare effects, so effective anti-cyberwashing policy requires coordinating false-claim regulation with broader cybersecurity governance while accounting for firms’ pricing responses and hackers’ attack incentives.