喻园管理论坛2024年第90期(总第1022期)

演讲主题:Market Entry of Agricultural Cooperatives under Open or Closed Membership

主讲人:周泉 澳大利亚伍伦贡大学商学院高级讲师

主持人:杨珺 信息管理与数据科学系教授

活动时间: 2024年10月21日（周一）14:30–16:30

活动地点:管院大楼121室

主讲人简介：

周泉博士现任澳大利亚伍伦贡大学商学院的高级讲师。她于2016年获得新西兰奥克兰大学博士学位。在加入伍伦贡大学之前，曾在新西兰梅西大学任讲师和奥克兰大学进行博士后研究。主要研究方向为非盈利运营及供应链和农业价值链研究。作为以实践为导向做研究的践行者，周泉博士热衷于将她的研究兴趣与实际需求相结合，并积极参与实践驱动的应用研究。她的研究成果发表在管理学权威期刊，如Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research等。

活动简介：

In response to pricing pressure from the incumbent investor-owned firms (IOFs) that dominate distribution and marketing, farmers may consider establishing a cooperative (co-op) to collectively process and market their products. In reaction to the co-op as a competitor, the IOF may employ one of the two strategies: deterrence or tolerance. In this paper, we develop a two-stage game-theoretic model to analyze the IOF's strategic responses to the potential entry of two types of co-ops: an open-membership co-op, which does not limit membership size, and a closed-membership co-op, where membership is regulated. We characterize the co-op entry conditions and the IOF’s deterrence strategies, providing several key insights. First, farmers will choose to establish a co-op only if the farm-gate price offered by the IOF falls below a certain threshold. Second, the potential entry of either type of co-op can pressure the IOF to raise the farm-gate price, which benefits farmers and consumers even if the co-op does not eventually enter the market. Further, we show that a closed co-op tends to be more competitive in gaining market access in the face of the IOF's deterrence strategies. However, this does not mean that a closed co-op, once established, will always achieve higher profits or deliver greater returns for its farmer-members. So, an open co-op can still be an attractive option for farmers, especially when it can generate substantial economies of scale.